Structural changes in economics during the last fifty years by Mishra, SK
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Structural changes in economics during
the last fifty years
SK Mishra
North-Eastern Hill University, Shillong (India)
17. September 2008
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/10534/
MPRA Paper No. 10534, posted 18. September 2008 09:29 UTC
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
* Note: The contents of this essay are almost wholly based on the materials available on the WIKIPEDIA. I do not claim 
any originality. The contents of this essay, therefore may be freely used/reproduced with or without 
acknowledgment/reference, or as in the tradition of GNU Free Documentation License (GFDL). GFDL conventions 
ensure the content is freely distributable and reproducible. I have compiled this essay for myself and incidentally for 
those who may be interested in such things. Errors and omissions are solely mine, while I thank those who made the 
contributions to WIKIPEDIA, though I personally know them not. 
 
Structural Changes in Economics during the Last Fifty Years* 
 
 SK Mishra 
Department of Economics 
North-Eastern Hill University,  
Shillong (India) 
 
 
1.0. The pre-classical economics:  The pre-classical economics, if this term can be used to 
denote an enquiry regarding the system of livelihood of the people and forces determining their 
prosperity that existed before the rise of science and industrial revolution, can be summarized in 
terms of the “Closed system-Caste-Power-Religion-Custom” nexus. The economic life of the 
commoners/laity was controlled by the nobility (or aristocracy) or the clergy (religious heads); 
tradition-bound it went in a perpetual cycle without much development for a very long time. 
This circularity gave rise to ‘caste’ – tying of the type of livelihood to birth in a social group (see 
Knox on the medieval society in the western civilization). The rise of science and the industrial 
revolution overthrew the power of the state as well as the priests and destabilized the age-old 
caste system. Power went into the hands of the industrialists and the formation of  ‘economic 
class’ began. These developments gave rise to economics as a new scientific enquiry. 
 
The subsequent development of economics as a structure of thought can be phased into (i) the 
classical synthesis (of pre-classical, Mercantilist and Physiocratic doctrines), (ii) The Marxian 
antithesis, (iii) the neoclassical reconstruction and orthodoxy, (iv) the “old” institutionalism, (v) 
the Keynesian antithesis, (vi) Keynesian economics -in the sense of Axel Leijonhufvud (1968), 
(vii) the Post-World War-II developments, (viii) the decline of neoclassicism, (ix) modern 
heterodoxy, and (x) the strands of modern economics.  
 
Modern heterodoxy (against the mainstream or orthodox neoclassicism) and modern economics 
have several (hitherto un-synthesized) currents:  (i) behavioral economics, (ii) experimental 
economics, (iii) evolutionary economics, (iv) agent-based economics, (v) new Institutional 
economics, (vi) post-autistic economics, and (vii) ecological economics. In what follows, a 
synoptic account of these currents is presented. 
 
2.0. Classical economics: Classical economics is widely regarded as the first modern school of 
economic thought. Its major developers include Adam Smith, David Ricardo, Thomas Malthus 
and John Stuart Mill. Sometimes the definition of classical economics is expanded to include 
William Petty, Johann Heinrich von Thünen, and possibly Karl Marx. 
 
Adam Smith's The Wealth of Nations in 1776 is usually considered to mark the beginning of 
classical economics. The school was active into the mid 19th century and was followed by 
neoclassical economics in Britain beginning around 1870. 
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Classical economists attempted and partially succeeded to explain economic growth and 
development. They produced their "magnificent dynamics" during a period in which capitalism 
was emerging from a past feudal society and in which the industrial revolution was leading to 
vast changes in society. These changes also raised the question of how a society could be 
organized around a system in which every individual sought his or her own (monetary) gain. 
 
Classical economists reoriented economics away from an analysis of the “ruler's personal 
interests” to a “class-based interest”. Physiocrat Francois Quesnay and Adam Smith, for 
example, identified the wealth of a nation with the yearly national income, instead of the king's 
treasury. Smith saw this income as produced by labor applied to land and capital equipment. 
Once land and capital equipment are appropriated by individuals, the national income is divided 
up between laborers, landlords, and capitalists in the form of wages, rent, and interest. 
 
2.1. Value and distribution theory: Classical economists developed a theory of value, or price, 
to investigate economic dynamics. William Petty introduced a fundamental distinction between 
market price and natural price to facilitate the portrayal of regularities in prices. Market prices 
are jostled by many transient influences that are difficult to theorize about at any abstract level. 
Natural prices, according to Petty, Smith, and Ricardo, for example, capture systematic and 
persistent forces operating at a point in time. Market prices always tend toward natural prices in 
a process that Smith described as somewhat similar to gravitational attraction. The value of a 
product was thought to depend on the costs involved in producing that product. The 
explanation of costs in Classical economics was simultaneously an explanation of distribution. A 
landlord received rent, workers received wages, and a capitalist tenant farmer received profits 
on their investment. 
 
The theory of what determined natural prices varied within the Classical school. Petty tried to 
develop a par between land and labor and had what might be called a land-and-labor theory of 
value. Smith confined the labor theory of value to a mythical pre-capitalist past. He stated that 
natural prices were the sum of natural rates of wages, profits (including interest on capital and 
wages of superintendence) and rent. Ricardo also had what might be described as a cost of 
production theory of value. He criticized Smith for describing rent as price-determining, instead 
of price-determined, and saw the labor theory of value as a good approximation. 
 
Some historians of economic thought, in particular, Sraffian economists,  see the classical theory 
of prices as determined from three givens: (i) The level of outputs at the level of Smith's 
"effectual demand", (ii) technology, and (iii) wages.  
 
From these givens, one can rigorously derive a theory of value. But neither Ricardo nor Marx, 
the most rigorous investigators of the theory of value during the Classical period, developed this 
theory fully. Those who reconstruct the theory of value in this manner see the determinants of 
natural prices as being explained by the Classical economists from within the theory of 
economics, albeit at a lower level of abstraction. For example, the theory of wages was closely 
connected to the theory of population. The Classical economists took the theory of the 
determinants of the level and growth of population as part of Political Economy. Since then, the 
theory of population has been seen as part of some other discipline than economics. In contrast 
to the Classical theory, the determinants of the neoclassical theory of value are the supply and 
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demand. In the neoclassical theory tastes /preferences, technology, and endowments are seen 
as exogenous to the economic system. 
 
Classical economics tended to stress the benefits of trade. Its theory of value was largely 
displaced by marginalist schools of thought which sees "use value" as deriving from the marginal 
utility that consumers finds in a good, and "exchange value" (i.e. natural price) as determined by 
the marginal opportunity - or disutility - cost of the inputs that make up the product. Ironically, 
considering the attachment of many classical economists to the free market, the largest school 
of economic thought that still adheres to classical form is the Marxian school. 
 
2.2. Monetary theory: British classical economists in the 19th century had a well-developed 
controversy between the Banking and the Currency schools. This parallels recent debates 
between proponents of the theory of endogeneous money, such as Nicholas Kaldor, and 
monetarists, such as Milton Friedman. Monetarists and members of the currency school argued 
that banks can and should control the supply of money. According to their theories, inflation is 
caused by banks issuing an excessive supply of money. According to proponents of the theory of 
endogeneous money, the supply of money automatically adjusts to the demand, and banks can 
only control the terms (e.g., the rate of interest) on which loans are made. 
 
3.0.  Neoclassical economics: Neoclassical economics is a term variously used for approaches to 
economics focusing on the determination of prices, outputs, and income distributions in 
markets through supply and demand, often as mediated through a hypothesized maximization 
of income-constrained utility by individuals and of cost-constrained profits of firms employing 
available information and factors of production, in accordance with rational choice theory. 
Mainstream economics is largely neoclassical in its assumptions, at least at the microeconomic 
level. There have been many critiques of neoclassical economics, often incorporated into newer 
versions of neoclassical theory as human awareness of economic criteria change. Neoclassical 
economics is often called “the marginalist school”, although the Austrian School founded by Carl 
Menger represents a distinct marginalist school. 
 
The term was originally introduced by Thorstein Veblen in 1900, in his Preconceptions of 
Economic Science, to distinguish marginalists in the tradition of Alfred Marshall from those in 
the Austrian School. It was later used by George Stigler and John Hicks (who presumed 
significant disputes amongst marginalist schools had been largely resolved) to include the work 
of Carl Menger, William Stanley Jevons, and John Bates Clark. Today it is often used to refer to 
mainstream economics and the Chicago school, although it has been used as an umbrella term 
encompassing a number of mainly defunct schools of thought, notably excluding institutional 
economics, various historical schools of economics, and Marxian economics, in addition to 
various other heterodox economics. 
 
Neoclassical economics is the singular element several schools of thought in economics address. 
There is not a complete agreement on what is meant by neoclassical economics, and the result 
is a wide range of neoclassical approaches to various problem areas and domains -- ranging from 
neoclassical theories of labor to neoclassical theories of demographic changes. As expressed by 
E. Roy Weintraub, neoclassical economics rests on three assumptions, although certain 
branches of neoclassical theory may have different approaches: (a). people have rational 
preferences among outcomes that can be identified and associated with a value, (b). individuals 
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maximize utility and firms maximize profits, (c). people act independently on the basis of full and 
relevant information. From these three assumptions, neoclassical economists have built a 
structure to understand the allocation of scarce resources among alternative ends -- in fact 
understanding such allocation is often considered the definition of economics to neoclassical 
theorists. Here's how William Stanley Jevons presented "the problem of Economics". 
 
"Given: a certain population, with various needs and powers of production, in possession of 
certain lands and other sources of material. Required: the mode of employing their labour which 
will maximize the utility of their produce." 
 
From the basic assumptions of neoclassical economics comes a wide range of theories about 
various areas of economic activity. For example, profit maximization lies behind the neoclassical 
theory of the firm, while the derivation of demand curves leads to an understanding of 
consumer goods, and the supply curve allows an analysis of the factors of production. Utility 
maximization is the source for the neoclassical theory of consumption, the derivation of demand 
curves for consumer goods, and the derivation of labor supply curves and reservation demand. 
Market supply and demand are aggregated across firms and individuals. Their interactions 
determine equilibrium output and price. The market supply and demand for each factor of 
production is derived analogously to those for market final output to determine equilibrium 
income and the income distribution. Factor demand incorporates the marginal-productivity 
relationship of that factor in the output market.  
 
Neoclassical economics emphasizes equilibria, where equilibria are the solutions of agent 
maximization problems. Regularities in economies are explained by methodological 
individualism, the position that economic phenomena can be explained by aggregating over the 
behavior of agents. The emphasis is on microeconomics. Institutions, which might be considered 
as prior to and conditioning individual behavior, are de-emphasized. Economic subjectivism 
accompanies these emphases.  
  
3.1. Connections with classical economics: Classical economics, developed in the 18th and 19th 
centuries, included a value theory and distribution theory. The value of a product was thought 
to depend on the costs involved in producing that product. The explanation of costs in Classical 
economics was simultaneously an explanation of distribution. A landlord received rent, workers 
received wages, and a capitalist tenant farmer received profits on their investment. This classic 
approach included the work of Adam Smith and David Ricardo. 
 
However, some economists gradually began emphasizing the perceived value of a goods to the 
consumer. They proposed a theory that the value of a product was to be explained with 
differences in "utility." This is called Utilitarianism and is associated with philosopher and 
economic thinker John Stuart Mill. 
 
The third step from political economy to economics was the introduction of the "marginal 
theory of value" or marginalism. Marginal value means that economic actors make decisions 
based on the "margins". This differs from the aggregate decision making of classical political 
economy in that it explains how vital goods such as water can be cheap, while luxuries can be 
expensive. 
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Neoclassical economics is conventionally dated from William Stanley Jevons's Theory of Political 
Economy (1871), Carl Menger's Principles of Economics (1871), and Leon Walras's Elements of 
Pure Economics (1874 – 1877). These three economists have been said to have promulgated the 
marginal utility revolution, or Neoclassical Revolution. Historians of economics and economists 
have debated: 
 
(a). Whether utility or marginalism was more essential to this revolution (whether the noun or 
the adjective in the phrase "marginal utility" is more important)  
(b). Whether there was a revolutionary change of thought or merely a gradual development and 
change of emphasis from their predecessors  
(c). Whether grouping these economists together disguises differences more important than 
their similarities.  
 
In particular, Walras was more interested in the interaction of markets than in explaining the 
individual psyche through a hedonistic psychology. Jevons saw his economics as an application 
and development of Jeremy Bentham's utilitarianism and never had a fully developed general 
equilibrium theory. Menger emphasized disequilibrium and the discrete. Menger had a 
philosophical objection to the use of mathematics in economics, while the other two modeled 
their theories after 19th century mechanics. 
 
Alfred Marshall's textbook, Principles of Economics (1890), was the dominant textbook in 
England a generation later. Marshall thought classical economics attempted to explain prices by 
the cost of production alone and the Continental Neoclassicists went too far in correcting this 
imbalance by overemphasizing utility and demand. Marshall thought the question of whether 
supply or demand was more important was analogous to the pointless question of which blade 
of a scissors did the cutting. 
 
Marshall explained prices by the intersection of supply and demand curves. The introduction of 
different market "periods" was an important innovation of Marshall: 
 
Market period:  The goods produced for sale on the market are taken as given data, e.g. in a fish 
market. Prices quickly adjust to clear markets.  
Short period:  Industrial capacity is taken as given. The level of output, the level of employment, 
the inputs of raw materials, and prices fluctuate to equate marginal cost and marginal revenue, 
where profits are maximized. Economic rents exist in short period equilibrium for fixed factors, 
and the rate of profit is not equated across sectors.  
Long period: The stock of capital goods, such as factories and machines, is not taken as given. 
Profit-maximizing equilibria determine both industrial capacity and the level at which it is 
operated.  
Very long period:  Technology, population trends, habits and customs are not taken as given, but 
allowed to vary in very long period models.  
 
Marshall took supply and demand as stable functions and extended supply and demand 
explanations of prices to all runs. He argued supply was easier to vary in longer runs, and thus 
became a more important determinate of price in the very long run. 
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3.2. Controversy on relationship between  classical and neoclassical economics:  Sraffians, who 
emphasize the discontinuity thesis, see classical economics as extending from Willam Petty's 
work in the 17th century to the break-up of the Ricardian system around 1830. The period 
between 1830 and the 1870s would then be dominated by "vulgar political economy", as Karl 
Marx characterized it. Sraffians argue that: the wages fund theory; Senior's abstinence theory of 
interest, which puts the return to capital on the same level as returns to land and labor; the 
explanation of equilibrium prices by well-behaved supply and demand functions; and Say's law, 
are not necessary or essential elements of the classical theory of value and distribution. Perhaps 
Schumpeter's view that John Stuart Mill put forth a half-way house between classical and 
neoclassical economics is consistent with this view. 
 
Sraffians generally see Marx as having rediscovered and restated the logic of classical 
economics, albeit for his own purposes. Others, such as Schumpeter, think of Marx as a follower 
of Ricardo. Even Samuel Hollander has recently explained that there is a textual basis in the 
classical economists for Marx's reading, although he does argue that it is an extremely narrow 
set of texts. 
 
The first position is that neoclassical economics is essentially continuous with classical 
economics. To scholars promoting this view, there is no hard and fast line between classical and 
neoclassical economics. There may be shifts of emphasis, such as between the long run and the 
short run and between supply and demand, but the neoclassical concepts are to be found 
confused or in embryo in classical economics. To these economists, there is only one theory of 
value and distribution. Alfred Marshall is a well-known promoter of this view. Samuel Hollander 
is probably its best current proponent. 
 
A second position sees two threads simultaneously being developed in classical economics. In 
this view, neoclassical economics is a development of certain exoteric (popular) views in Adam 
Smith. Ricardo was a sport, developing certain esoteric (known by only the select) views in 
Adam Smith. This view can be found in W. Stanley Jevons, who referred to Ricardo as something 
like "that able, but wrong-headed man" who put economics on the "wrong track". One can also 
find this view in Maurice Dobb's Theories of Value and Distribution Since Adam Smith: Ideology 
and Economic Theory (1973), as well as in Karl Marx's Theories of Surplus Value. 
 
The above does not exhaust the possibilities. John Maynard Keynes thought of classical 
economics as starting with Ricardo and being ended by the publication of Keynes' General 
Theory of Employment Interest and Money. The defining criterion of classical economics, on this 
view, is Say's law. 
 
One difficulty in these debates is that the participants are frequently arguing about whether 
there is a non-neoclassical theories that should be reconstructed and applied today to describe 
capitalist economies. Some see classical economics as of antiquarian interest. 
 
3.3. Further developments: An important change in neoclassical economics occurred around 
1933. Joan Robinson and Edward H. Chamberlin, with the near simultaneous publication of their 
respective books, The Economics of Imperfect Competition (1933) and The Theory of 
Monopolistic Competition (1933), introduced models of imperfect competition. Theories of 
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market forms and industrial organization grew out of this work. They also emphasized certain 
tools, such as the marginal revenue curve. 
 
Joan Robinson's work on imperfect competition, at least, was a response to certain problems of 
Marshallian partial equilibrium theory highlighted by Piero Sraffa. Anglo-American economists 
also responded to these problems by turning towards general equilibrium theory, developed on 
the European continent by Walras and Vilfredo Pareto.  Hicks's Value and Capital (1939) was 
influential in introducing his English-speaking colleagues to these traditions. He, in turn, was 
influenced by the Austrian School economist Friedrich Hayek's move to the London School of 
Economics, where Hicks then studied. 
 
These developments were accompanied by the introduction of new tools, such as indifference 
curves and the theory of ordinal utility. The level of mathematical sophistication of neoclassical 
economics increased. Paul Samuelson's Foundations of Economic Analysis (1947) contributed to 
this increase in formal rigor. 
 
The interwar period in American economics has been argued to have been pluralistic, with 
neoclassical economics and institutionalism competing for allegiance. Frank Knight, an early 
Chicago school economist attempted to combine both schools. But this increase in mathematics 
was accompanied by greater dominance of neoclassical economics in Anglo-American 
universities after World War II. 
 
Hicks' book, Value and Capital had two main parts. The second, which was arguably not 
immediately influential, presented a model of temporary equilibrium. Hicks was influenced 
directly by Hayek's notion of intertemporal coordination and paralleled by earlier work by 
Lindhal. This was part of an abandonment of disaggregated long run models. This trend probably 
reached its culmination with the Arrow-Debreu model of intertemporal equilibrium. The Arrow-
Debreu model has canonical presentations in Gerard Debreu's Theory of Value (1959) and in 
Arrow and Hahn. 
 
Many of these developments were against the backdrop of improvements in both econometrics, 
that is the ability to measure prices and changes in goods and services, as well as their aggregate 
quantities, and in the creation of macroeconomics, or the study of whole economies. The 
attempt to combine neo-classical microeconomics and Keynesian macroeconomics would lead 
to the neoclassical synthesis which has been the dominant paradigm of economic reasoning in 
English-speaking countries since the 1950s. Hicks and Samuelson were for example instrumental 
in mainstreaming Keynesian economics. 
 
Macroeconomics influenced the neoclassical synthesis from the other direction, undermining 
foundations of classical economic theory such as Say's Law, and assumptions about political 
economy such as the necessity for a hard-money standard. These developments are reflected in 
neoclassical theory by the search for the occurrence in markets of the equilibrium conditions of 
Pareto optimality and self-sustainability. 
 
3.4. Criticisms: Neoclassical economics is sometimes criticized for having a normative bias. In 
this view, it does not focus on explaining actual economies, but instead on describing a "utopia" 
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in which Pareto optimality applies. Key assumptions of neoclassical economics which are 
criticised as unrealistic include: 
 
(a). The assumption that individuals act rationally may be viewed as ignoring important aspects 
of human behavior. Many see the "economic man" as being demonstrably different from a real 
man on the real earth. The assumption of rational expectations which has been introduced in 
some more modern neo-classical models (sometimes also called new classical) can also be 
criticized on the grounds of realism. 
 
(b). Problems with making the neoclassical general equilibrium theory compatible with an 
economy that develops over time and includes capital goods. This was explored in a major 
debate in the 1960s—the "Cambridge capital controversy"—about the validity of neoclassical 
economics, with an emphasis on the economic growth, capital, aggregate theory, and the 
marginal productivity theory of distribution. There were also internal attempts by neoclassical 
economists to extend the Arrow-Debreu model to disequilibrium investigations of stability and 
uniqueness. However a result known as the Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu theorem suggests that 
the assumptions that must be made to insure that the equilibrium is stable and unique are quite 
restrictive. 
 
In the opinion of some, these developments have found fatal weaknesses in neoclassical 
economics. Economists, however, have continued to use highly mathematical models, and many 
equate neoclassical economics with economics, unqualified. Mathematical models include those 
in game theory (against atomistic individualism), linear programming (against marginalism), and 
econometrics (against deductionism) , many of which might be considered non-neoclassical. So 
economists often refer to what has evolved out of neoclassical economics as "mainstream 
economics". Critics of neoclassical economics are divided in those who think that highly 
mathematical method is inherently wrong and those who think that mathematical method is 
potentially good even if contemporary methods have problems. 
 
The basic theory of a downward sloping aggregate demand curve is criticized for its allegedly 
strong assumptions. 
 
In general, allegedly overly unrealistic assumptions are one of the most common criticisms 
towards neoclassical economics. For example, many theories assume perfect knowledge for 
market actors and the most common theory of finance markets assumes that debts are always 
paid back and that any actor can raise as much loan as he wants at any given point of time. 
 
The basic theory of production in neoclassical economics is criticized for incorrect assumptions 
about the rationales of producers. According to the theory, increasing production costs are the 
reason for producers not to produce over a certain amount. Some empirical counter arguments 
claim that most producers are not making their production decisions in the light of increasing 
production costs. For example they often may have additional capacity that could be taken into 
use, if producing more was desirable. 
 
Often at individual levels, variables such as supply and demand, which are independent, are 
(allegedly wrongly) assumed to be independent also at aggregate level. This criticism has been 
applied to many central theories of neoclassical economics. 
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The critique of the assumption of rationality is not confined to social theorists and ecologists. 
Many economists, even contemporaries, have criticized this vision of economic man. Thorstein 
Veblen put it most sardonically. Neoclassical economics assumes a person to be, 
 
"a lightning calculator of pleasures and pains, who oscillates like a homogeneous globule of 
desire of happiness under the impulse of stimuli that shift about the area, but leave him intact." 
 
Herbert Simon's theory of bounded rationality has probably been the most influential of the 
heterodox approaches. Is economic man a first approximation to a more realistic psychology, an 
approach only valid in some sphere of human lives, or a general methodological principle for 
economics? Early neoclassical economists often leaned toward the first two approaches, but the 
latter has become prevalent. 
 
Neoclassical economics is also often seen as relying too heavily on complex mathematical 
models, such as those used in general equilibrium theory, without enough regard to whether 
these actually describe the real economy. Many see an attempt to model a system as complex 
as a modern economy by a mathematical model as unrealistic and doomed to failure. Famous 
answer to this criticism is Milton Friedman's claim that theories should be judged by their ability 
to predict events rather than by the realisticity of their assumptions. Naturally, critics claim that 
neoclassical economics (as well as other branches of economics) has not been very good at 
predicting events. 
 
Critics of neoclassical models accuse it of copying of 19th century mechanics and the 
"clockwork" model of society which seems to justify elite privileges as arising "naturally" from 
the social order based on economic competitions. This is echoed by modern critics in the anti-
globalization movement who often blame the neoclassical theory, as it has been applied by the 
IMF in particular, for inequities in global debt and trade relations. They assert it ignores the 
complexity of nature and of human creativity, and seeks mechanical ideas like equilibrium. 
 
It is fair to say that many (but not all) of these criticisms can only be directed towards a subset of 
the neoclassical models (for example, there are many neoclassical models where unregulated 
markets fail to achieve Pareto-optimality and there has recently been an increased interest in 
modelling bounded rationality). 
 
4.0. Heterodox economics: Heterodox economics refers to the approaches, or schools of 
economic thought, that are considered outside of mainstream or orthodox economics. 
Heterodox Economics is an umbrella term used to cover various separate unorthodox 
approaches, schools, or traditions. These include post Keynesianism, Technocratic, Old 
institutionalism, feminist, social, Marxian, Thermo-economics and Austrian economics, among 
others. These views may be contrasted with the framework used by the majority of economists, 
commonly referred to by its supporters as mainstream and by critics as orthodox. This 
framework consists of the neoclassical synthesis, which combines a neoclassical approach on 
microeconomics and Keynesian approach to macroeconomics, with varying degrees of 
emphasis. 
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It is difficult to define heterodox economics. The International Confederation of Associations for 
Pluralism in Economics (ICAPE) has prudently avoided defining its umbrella too specifically, 
choosing instead to define its mission as "promoting pluralism in economics." All strands of 
socialism are heterodox, but not all heterodox schools are socialist. A key challenge for 
"heterodoxy" is to define itself in ways that move beyond the rubric of "non-neoclassical" 
economics. In defining a common ground in the "critical commentary" some heterodox 
economists, such as Steve Cohn, have tried to do three things: (1) identify shared ideas that 
generate a pattern of heterodox critique across topics and chapters of introductory macro texts; 
(2) give special attention to ideas that link methodological differences to policy differences; and 
(3) characterize the common ground in ways that permit distinct paradigms to develop common 
differences with textbook economics in different ways. 
 
The orthodox economics has also been alleged to be an apologia in defense of the market 
economy based on the institution of private property and individualism. The medieval  economy 
was tradition bound and robust. The industrial revolution perforce threw this economy out of 
gear and a natural question arose if the new order would be stable and desirable. Stated 
differently, the new order gave rise to the six fundamental questions: (i) will the society 
organized on the principles of exchange stay composed or will it fall apart (the question of 
existence of equilibrium)?, (ii) will such an equilibrium be unique (a multiplicity of equilibria 
poses difficult and embarrassing questions)?, (iii) will such an equilibrium be robust (the 
question of stability of equilibrium)?, (iv) will such an economy (society) be efficient?, (v) will it 
grow or expand forever?, and (vi) will it be just?  The classical economists, Adam Smith in 
particular, answered all these questions affirmatively using a characteristic methodology. 
However, Karl Marx challenged the entire structure of faith on the merits of the exchange 
economy and shattered all optimism regarding the said order.  The neoclassicists, mostly using 
their own new (mathematical, marginalist, rationalistic, atomistic, hedonistic, etc) methodology 
set out to prove that answers to all those six questions were in affirmative. They restructured 
the faith in the said order. In so doing, they had to distance themselves from the reality and they 
did not mind doing so. This endeavour made neoclassical economics dogmatic and religious in 
nature. Leijonhufvud (1973) characterized neoclassical economics in the most sarcastic 
manner. Heterodox economics grew out of the disapproval of the said dogma.   
 
4.1. Rationality:  One of the most broadly accepted principles of neoclassical economics is the 
assumption of the "rationality of economic agents". Indeed, for a number of economists, the 
notion of rational maximizing behavior is taken to be synonymous with economic behavior. 
When some economists' studies do not embrace the rationality assumption, they are seen as 
placing the analyses outside the boundaries of the Neoclassical economics discipline. 
Neoclassical economics begins with the a priori assumptions that agents are "rational" and that 
they seek to "maximize their individual utility" (or profits) subject to environmental constraints. 
These assumptions provide the backbone for rational choice theory, and from this basis 
neoclassical economists derive the familiar supply and demand functions which, under certain 
conditions, will lead to a determinate market clearing equilibrium. Under even stricter 
conditions this equilibrium will be Pareto efficient. 
 
Heterodox economics reject these fundamental assumptions on which most of neoclassical 
economics theory has been built. Up to 1980 heterodox economics could be defined as: 
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(a). Rejection of the atomistic individual conception in favor of a socially embedded individual 
conception;  
(b). Emphasis on time as an irreversible historical process;  
(c). Reasoning in terms of mutual influences between individuals and social structures.  
 
Hence, while mainstream (neoclassical) economics may be defined in terms of the "Closed 
system-Rationality-Individualism-Equilibrium" nexus, heterodox economics may be defined in 
terms of a "Open system-Institutions-History-pluralism-Social structure-Evolution" nexus. 
Against these two, the classical economics may be defined in terms of “Open system-Class-
Value-Distribution-Development” nexus while the pre-classical economics can be defined in 
terms of “Closed system-Caste-Power-Religion-Custom” nexus. 
 
From 1980 (or thereabouts) significant changes begin to occur in economics; a number of new 
research programs began, in various ways, to be recognized by the mainstream economics. 
These include behavioral economics, complexity economics, evolutionary economics, 
experimental economics, neuro-economics, and others. As a consequence, some heterodox 
economists proposed that the definition of heterodox economics has to be adapted to this new, 
more complex reality. 
 
Heterodox economics post-1980 is a complex structure, being composed out of two broadly 
different kinds of heterodox work, each internally differentiated with a number of research 
programs having different historical origins and orientations: the traditional left heterodoxy 
familiar to most and the 'new heterodoxy' resulting from other science imports.  
 
4.2. Rejection of neoclassical economics: There is no single "heterodox economic theory"; there 
are many different "heterodox theories" in existence. "What they all share, however, is a 
rejection of the neoclassical orthodoxy as representing the appropriate tool for understanding 
the workings of economic and social life. The reasons for this rejection may vary. 
 
Reasons for the rejection of neoclassical economics: The neoclassical framework has often been 
rejected on the arguments such as: (a). that neoclassical theory is appropriate as a tool only 
under certain limited conditions, where there is "perfect" or "near-perfect" competition; (b) the 
Austrian School in particular considers neoclassical theory relevant for conditions of equilibrium, 
(c). that it is useless as a tool for understanding economic and social life, (d). that all theories are 
valid so long as they are internally consistent, (e). that neoclassical theory is a form of ideology 
or religion, which is grounded in unscientific concepts. Neoclassical economic theory is 
grounded in a particular conception of human psychology, agency or decision-making. It is 
assumed that all human beings make economic decisions so as to maximize pleasure or utility. 
Some heterodox theories reject this basic assumption of neoclassical theory, arguing for 
alternative understandings of how economic decisions are made and/or how human psychology 
works. It is possible to accept the notion that humans are pleasure seeking machines, yet reject 
the idea that economic decisions are governed by such pleasure seeking. Human beings may, for 
example, be unable to make choices consistent with pleasure maximization due to social 
constraints and/or coercion. Humans may also be unable to correctly assess the choice points 
that are most likely to lead to maximum pleasure, even if they are unconstrained (except in 
budgetary terms) in making such choices. And it is also possible that the notion of pleasure 
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seeking is itself a meaningless assumption because it is either impossible to test or too general 
to refute. Economic theories that reject the basic assumption of economic decisions as the 
outcome of pleasure maximization are heterodox. 
 
4.3. Most recent developments:  Over the past two decades, the intellectual agendas of 
heterodox economists have taken a decidedly pluralist turn. Leading heterodox thinkers have 
moved beyond the established paradigms of Austrian, Feminist, Institutional-Evolutionary, 
Marxian, Post Keynesian, Radical, Social, and Sraffian economics—opening up new lines of 
analysis, criticism, and dialogue among dissenting schools of thought. This cross-fertilization of 
ideas is creating a new generation of scholarship in which novel combinations of heterodox 
ideas are being brought to bear on important contemporary and historical problems, such as 
socially-grounded reconstructions of the individual in economic theory; the goals and tools of 
economic measurement and professional ethics; the complexities of policymaking in today's 
global political economy; and innovative connections among formerly separate theoretical 
traditions (Marxian, Austrian, feminist, ecological, Sraffian, institutionalist, and post-Keynesian).  
 
David Colander, an advocate of complexity economics, argues that the ideas of heterodox 
economists are now being discussed in the mainstream without mention of the heterodox 
economists, because the tools to analyze institutions, uncertainty, and other factors have now 
been developed by the mainstream. He suggests that heterodox economists should embrace 
rigorous mathematics and attempt to work from within the mainstream, rather than treating it 
as an enemy. 
 
4.4. Energy accounting economics and balance:  An energy balance can be used to track energy 
through a system, and is a very useful tool for determining resource use and environmental 
impacts. The idea is to use the First and Second laws of thermodynamics to determine how 
much energy is needed at each point in the system, and in what form that energy is. An Energy 
Accounting system keeps track of energy in, energy out, and non-useful energy versus work 
done, and transformations within the system.  
 
Physical scientists and biologists were the first individuals to use energy flows to explain social 
and economic development. Joseph Henry, an American physicist and first secretary of the 
Smithsonian Institution, remarked that the "fundamental principle of political economy is that 
the physical labor of man can only be ameliorated by...the transformation of matter from a 
crude state to a artificial condition...by expending what is called power or energy." 
 
Energy Accounting which developed as a concept in the 1930's, is the hypothetical system of 
distribution, proposed by Technocracy Incorporated in the Technocracy Study Course, which 
would record the energy used to produce and distribute goods and services consumed by 
citizens in a Technate instead of relying on a system of using money. Scientists have written and 
speculated on different aspects of energy accounting.  Many variations of energy accounting are 
in use now, as this issue relates to current (price system) economics directly, as well as 
projected models in possible Non-market economics systems. 
 
4.5. Other perspectives: Research is also being done in the multidisciplinary field of cognitive 
science on individual decision making, information as a general phenomenon, distributed 
cognition and their implications on economic dynamicity. Some schools in the social sciences 
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aim to promote certain perspectives: classical and modern political economy; economic history; 
economic sociology and anthropology; gender and racial issues in economics; economic ethics 
and social justice; development studies; and so on. 
 
5.0. Behavioural economics: Behavioral economics applies scientific research on human and 
social cognitive and emotional biases to better understand economic decisions and how they 
affect market prices, returns and the allocation of resources. It is primarily concerned with the 
rationality, or lack thereof, of economic agents. Behavioral models typically integrate insights 
from psychology with neo-classical economic theory. 
 
During the classical period, economics had a close link with psychology. For example, Adam 
Smith wrote The Theory of Moral Sentiments, an important text describing psychological 
principles of individual behavior; and Jeremy Bentham wrote extensively on the psychological 
underpinnings of utility. Economists began to distance themselves from psychology during the 
development of neo-classical economics as they sought to reshape the discipline as a natural 
science, with explanations of economic behavior deduced from assumptions about the nature of 
economic agents. The concept of homo economicus was developed, and the psychology of this 
entity was fundamentally rational. Nevertheless, psychological explanations continued to inform 
the analysis of many important figures in the development of neo-classical economics such as 
Francis Edgeworth, Vilfredo Pareto, Irving Fisher and John Maynard Keynes. 
 
Although psychology had nearly disappeared from economic discussions by the mid 20th 
century, it, somehow, managed to stage a resurgence, and certain factors were responsible for 
this resurgence in the continued development of behavioral economics. Expected utility and 
discounted utility models began to gain wide acceptance, generating testable hypotheses about 
decision making under uncertainty and intertemporal consumption respectively. Soon a number 
of observed and repeatable anomalies challenged those hypotheses. Furthermore, during the 
1960s cognitive psychology had begun to shed more light on the brain as an information 
processing device (in contrast to behaviorist models). Psychologists in this field such as Ward 
Edwards, Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman began to compare their cognitive models of 
decision making under risk and uncertainty to economic models of rational behavior. In 
Mathematical psychology, there is a longstanding interest in the transitivity of preference and 
what kind of measurement scale utility constitutes. 
 
An important paper in the development of the behavioral finance and economics fields was 
written by Kahneman and Tversky in 1979. This paper, 'Prospect theory: An Analysis of Decision 
Under Risk', used cognitive psychological techniques to explain a number of documented 
divergences of economic decision making from neo-classical theory. Over time many other 
psychological effects have been incorporated into behavioral finance, such as overconfidence 
and the effects of limited attention. Further milestones in the development of the field include a 
well attended and diverse conference at the University of Chicago, a special 1997 edition of the 
Quarterly Journal of Economics ('In Memory of Amos Tversky') devoted to the topic of 
behavioral economics and the award of the Nobel prize to Daniel Kahneman in 2002 "for having 
integrated insights from psychological research into economic science, especially concerning 
human judgment and decision-making under uncertainty". 
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Prospect theory is an example of generalized expected utility theory. Although not commonly 
included in discussions of the field of behavioral economics, generalized expected utility theory 
is similarly motivated by concerns about the descriptive inaccuracy of expected utility theory. 
 
Behavioral economics has also been applied to problems of intertemporal choice. The most 
prominent idea is that of hyperbolic discounting, proposed by George Ainslie (1975), in which a 
high rate of discount is used between the present and the near future, and a lower rate 
between the near future and the far future. This pattern of discounting is dynamically 
inconsistent (or time-inconsistent), and therefore inconsistent with some models of rational 
choice, since the rate of discount between time t and t+1 will be low at time t-1, when t is the 
near future, but high at time t when t is the present and time t+1 the near future. As part of the 
discussion of hypberbolic discounting, has been animal and human work on Melioration theory 
and Matching Law of Richard Herrnstein. They suggest that behavior is not based on expected 
utility rather it is based on previous reinforcement experience. 
 
5.1. Methodology:  At the outset behavioral economics and finance theories had been 
developed almost exclusively from experimental observations and survey responses, although in 
more recent times real world data have taken a more prominent position. Functional magnetic 
resonance imaging fMRI has complemented this effort through its use in determining which 
areas of the brain are active during various steps of economic decision making. Experiments 
simulating market situations such as stock market trading and auctions are seen as particularly 
useful as they can be used to isolate the effect of a particular bias upon behavior; observed 
market behavior can typically be explained in a number of ways, carefully designed experiments 
can help narrow the range of plausible explanations. Experiments are designed to be incentive-
compatible, with binding transactions involving real money being the "norm". 
 
5.2. Key observations:  There are three main themes in behavioral finance and economics: 
 
Heuristics: People often make decisions based on approximate rules of thumb, not strictly 
rational analysis. See also cognitive biases and bounded rationality.  
Framing: The way a problem or decision is presented to the decision maker will affect his action.  
Market inefficiencies: There are explanations for observed market outcomes that are contrary 
to rational expectations and market efficiency. These include mis-pricings, non-rational decision 
making, and return anomalies. Richard Thaler, in particular, has described specific market 
anomalies from a behavioral perspective.  
 
Recently, Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny as well as Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam have 
built models based on extrapolation (seeing patterns in random sequences) and overconfidence 
to explain security market over- and underreactions, though such models have not been used in 
the money management industry. These models assume that errors or biases are correlated 
across agents so that they do not cancel out in aggregate. This would be the case if a large 
fraction of agents look at the same signal (such as the advice of an analyst) or have a common 
bias. 
 
More generally, cognitive biases may also have strong anomalous effects in the aggregate if 
there is a social contamination with a strong emotional content (collective greed or fear), 
leading to more widespread phenomena such as herding and groupthink. Behavioral finance 
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and economics rests as much on social psychology within large groups as on individual 
psychology. However, some behavioral models explicitly demonstrate that a small but 
significant anomalous group can also have market-wide effects. 
 
5.3. Critical conclusions of behavioral economics:  Critics of behavioral economics typically 
stress the rationality of economic agents. They contend that experimentally observed behavior 
is inapplicable to market situations, as learning opportunities and competition will ensure at 
least a close approximation of rational behavior. 
 
Others note that cognitive theories, such as prospect theory, are models of decision making, not 
generalized economic behavior, and are only applicable to the sort of once-off decision 
problems presented to experiment participants or survey respondents. 
 
Traditional economists are also skeptical of the experimental and survey based techniques 
which are used extensively in behavioral economics. Economists typically stress revealed 
preferences over stated preferences (from surveys) in the determination of economic value. 
Experiments and surveys must be designed carefully to avoid systemic biases, strategic behavior 
and lack of incentive compatibility, and many economists are distrustful of results obtained in 
this manner due to the difficulty of eliminating these problems. 
 
Some behavioural economists dismiss these criticisms, claiming that results are typically 
reproduced in various situations and countries and can lead to good theoretical insight. 
Behavioral economists have also incorporated these criticisms by focusing on field studies rather 
than lab experiments. Some economists look at this split as a fundamental schism between 
experimental economics and behavioral economics, but prominent behavioral and experimental 
economists tend to overlap techniques and approaches in answering common questions. For 
example, many prominent behavioral economists are actively investigating neuro-economics, 
which is entirely experimental and cannot be verified in the field. 
 
Other proponents of behavioral economics note that neoclassical models often fail to predict 
outcomes in real world contexts. Behavioral insights can be used to update neoclassical 
equations, and behavioral economists note that these revised models not only reach the same 
correct predictions as the traditional models, but also correctly predict some outcomes where 
the traditional models failed. 
 
6.0. Experimental economics: Experimental economics is the application of the laboratory 
method to test the validity of various economic theories and to test bed new market 
mechanisms. Using cash-motivated subjects, economic experiments create real-world incentives 
to help us better understand why markets and other exchange systems work the way they do. 
Experiments may be conducted in laboratory settings or in the field. The history and 
methodology of experimental economics was summarized by Vernon Smith: 
 
"Historically, the method and subject matter of economics have presupposed that it was a non-
experimental (or 'field observational') science more like astronomy or meteorology than physics 
or chemistry. Based on general, introspectively 'plausible', assumptions about human 
preferences, and about the cost and technology based supply response of producers, 
economists have sought to understand the functioning of economies, using observations 
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generated by economic outcomes realized over time. The data of the astronomer is of this same 
type, but it would be wrong to conclude that astronomy and economics are methodologically 
equivalent. There are two important differences between astronomy and economics which help 
to illuminate some of the methodological problems of economics. First, based upon parallelism 
(maintained hypothesis that the same physical laws hold everywhere), astronomy draws on all 
the relevant theory from classical mechanics and particle physics -- theory which has evolved 
under rigorous laboratory tests. Traditionally, economists have not had an analogous body of 
tested behavioural principles that have survived controlled experimental tests, and which can be 
assumed to apply with insignificant error to the microeconomic behaviour that underpins the 
observable operations of the economy. Analogously, one might have supposed that there would 
have arisen an important area of common interest between economics and, say, experimental 
psychology, similar to that between astronomy and physics, but this has only started to develop 
in recent years." 
 
6.1. Experimental topics: Economics experiments can be loosely classified into the following 
topics: Markets, Games, Decision making, Bargaining, Auctions, Coordination, Social 
Preferences, Learning, Matching, and Field Experiments. 
 
6.2. Coordination games:  Coordination games are games with multiple equilibria, often Pareto 
ranked. There are two general sets of questions that experimental economists typically ask 
when examining such games: (1) Can laboratory subjects coordinate, or learn to coordinate, on 
one of multiple equilibria, and if so are there general principles that can help predict which 
equilibrium is likely to be chosen? (2) Can laboratory subjects coordinate, or learn to coordinate, 
on the Pareto best equilibrium and if not, are there conditions or mechanisms which would help 
subjects coordinate on the Pareto best equilibrium? Deductive selection principles are those 
that allow predictions based on the properties of the game alone. Inductive selection principles 
are those that allow predictions based on characterizations of dynamics. 
 
6.3. Learning experiments:  In games of two players or more, the subjects often form beliefs 
about what actions the other subjects are taking and these beliefs are updated over time. This is 
known as belief learning. Subjects also tend to make the same decisions that have rewarded 
them with high payoffs in the past. This is known as reinforcement learning. 
 
Until the 1990s, simple adaptive models, such as Cournot best response or Fictitious play, were 
generally used. In the mid-1990s, Alvin Roth and Ido Erev demonstrated that reinforcement 
learning can make useful predictions in experimental games. In 1999, Colin Camerer and Teck 
Ho introduced Experience Weighted Attraction, known as EWA, a general model that 
incorporated reinforcement and belief learning, and shows that fictitious play is mathematically 
equivalent to generalized reinforcement, provided weights are placed on past history. 
 
Criticisms of EWA include overfitting due to many parameters, lack of generality over games, 
and the possibility that the interpretation of EWA parameters may be difficult. Overfitting is 
addressed by estimating parameters on some of the experimental periods or experimental 
subjects and forecasting behavior in the remaining sample (if models are overfitting, these out-
of-sample validation forecasts will be much less accurate than in-sample fits, which they 
generally are not). Generality in games is addressed by replacing fixed parameters with "self-
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tuning" functions of experience, allowing pseudo-parameters to change over the course of a 
game and to also vary systematically across games. 
 
Modern experimental economists have done much notable work recently. Roberto Weber has 
raised issues of learning without feedback. David Cooper and John Kagel have investigated types 
of learning over similar strategies. Ido Erev and Greg Barron have looked at learning in cognitive 
strategies. Dale Stahl has characterized learning over decision making rules. Charles A. Holt has 
studied logit learning in different kinds of games, including games with multiple equilibria. 
Wilfred Amaldoss has looked at interesting applications of EWA in marketing. Amnon Rapoport, 
Jim Parco and Ryan Murphy have investigated reinforcement-based adaptive learning models in 
one of the most celebrated paradoxes in game theory known as the centipede game. 
 
6.4. Market games: Vernon Smith, formerly of the University of Arizona and now at the 
Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science at George Mason University conducted pioneering 
economics experiments on the convergence of prices and quantities to their theoretical 
competitive equilibrium values in experimental markets. Smith studied the behavior of "buyers" 
and "sellers", who are told how much they "value" a fictitious commodity, and then are asked to 
competitively "bid" or "ask" on these commodities following the rules of various real world 
market institutions, such as the Double auction (both sides can bid) used in many stock 
exchanges, as well the English auction and the Dutch auction (see Auctions). Smith found that in 
some forms of centralized trading, prices and quantities traded in such markets converge on the 
values that would be predicted by the economic theory of perfect competition, despite the 
conditions not meeting many of the assumptions of perfect competition (large numbers, perfect 
information). 
 
Over the years, Smith pioneered -along with other collaborators- the use of controlled 
laboratory experiments in economics, and established it as a legitimate tool in economics and 
other related fields. Charles Plott of the California Institute of Technology collaborated with 
Smith in the 1970s and pioneered experiments in political science, as well as using experiments 
to inform economic design or engineering to inform policies. In 2002, Smith was awarded 
(jointly with Daniel Kahneman) the Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic Sciences "for having 
established laboratory experiments as a tool in empirical economic analysis, especially in the 
study of alternative market mechanisms". 
 
6.5.  Social preferences: The term "social preferences" refers to the concern (or lack thereof) 
that people have for each other's well-being, and it encompasses altruism, spitefulness, tastes 
for equality, and tastes for reciprocity. Experiments on social preferences generally study 
economic games including the dictator game, the ultimatum game, the trust game, the public 
goods game, and modifications to these canonical settings. As one example of results, 
ultimatum game experiments have shown that people are generally willing to sacrifice monetary 
rewards when offered low allocations, thus behaving inconsistently with simple models of self-
interest. Economic experiments have measured how this deviation varies across cultures. (More 
market-oriented societies tend to have higher inequity aversion.) 
 
6.6. Bounded rationality: Some models of human behavior in the social sciences assume that 
humans can be reasonably approximated or described as "rational" entities (see for example 
rational choice theory). Many economics models assume that people are hyperrational, and 
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would never do anything to violate their preferences. The concept of bounded rationality revises 
this assumption to account for the fact that perfectly rational decisions are often not feasible in 
practice due to the finite computational resources available for making them. 
 
The term is thought to have been coined by Herbert Simon. In Models of My Life, Herbert Simon 
points out that most people are only partly rational, and are in fact emotional/irrational in the 
remaining part of their actions. In another work, he states "boundedly rational agents 
experience limits in formulating and solving complex problems and in processing (receiving, 
storing, retrieving, transmitting) information" (Williamson, p. 553, citing Simon). Simon 
describes a number of dimensions along which "classical" models of rationality can be made 
somewhat more realistic, while sticking within the vein of fairly rigorous formalization. These 
include: (i) limiting what sorts of utility functions there might be, (ii) recognizing the costs of 
gathering and processing information, (iii) the possibility of having a "vector" or "multi-valued" 
utility function.  
 
Simon suggests that economic agents employ the use of heuristics to make decisions rather than 
a strict rigid rule of optimization. They do this because of the complexity of the situation, and 
their inability to process and compute the expected utility of every alternative action. 
Deliberation costs might be high and there are often other economic activities where similar 
decision making is required. 
 
Daniel Kahneman proposes bounded rationality as a model to overcome some of the limitations 
of the rational-agent models in economic literature. 
 
As decision makers have to make decisions about how and when to decide, Ariel Rubinstein 
proposed to model bounded rationality by explicitly specifying decision making procedures. This 
puts the study of decision procedures on the research agenda. 
 
Gerd Gigerenzer argues that most decision theorists who have discussed bounded rationality 
have not really followed Simon's ideas about it. Rather, they have either considered how 
people's decisions might be made sub-optimal by the limitations of human rationality, or have 
constructed elaborate optimising models of how people might cope with their inability to 
optimize. Gigerenzer instead proposes to examine simple alternatives to a full rationality 
analysis as a mechanism for decision making, and he and his colleagues have shown that such 
simple heuristics frequently lead to better decisions than the theoretically optimal procedure. 
 
From a computational point of view, decision procedures can be encoded in algorithms and 
heuristics. Edward Tsang argues that the effective rationality of an agent is determined by its 
computational intelligence. Everything else being equal, an agent that has better algorithms and 
heuristics could make "more rational" (more optimal) decisions than one that has poorer 
heuristics and algorithms. 
 
A school of economic thought that traditionally assumes that economic agents have bounded 
rationality is the Austrian school. 
 
7.0. Evolutionary economics: Evolutionary economics is a relatively new economic and diverse 
school of thought that is inspired by evolutionary biology. Much like mainstream it stresses 
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complex interdependencies, competition, growth, structural change, and resource constraints 
but differs in the approaches which are used to analyze these phenomenon. 
 
Mainstream economic reasoning begins with the definition of scarcity, then assumes the 
existence of a "rational agent" bent solely on the attainment of one goal — the maximization of 
her/his welfare as defined by that agent. The scheme of valuation ("preferences" or "tastes") 
used by the decision-maker is also assumed to be constant and native to the agent 
("independent preferences"). Given the foregoing stipulations, the determination of the 
"rational choice" for any agent becomes a straightforward exercise in the differential calculus. 
 
Evolutionary economics does not take the characteristics of either the objects of choice or of the 
decision-maker as fixed. It purports to challenge the mainstream of the economic discipline in a 
similar manner to how Charles Darwin challenged previous views of human genealogy with 
evolutionary theory. 
 
7.1. Predecessors of evolutionary economics: Karl Marx began in the mid-19th century with his 
schema of stages of historical development, by introducing the notion that "human nature" was 
not constant and was not determinative of the nature of the social system; on the contrary, he 
made it a principle that human behavior was a function of the social and economic system in 
which it occurred. 
 
At approximately the same time, Charles Darwin developed a general framework for 
comprehending any process whereby small, random variations could be accumulated and 
selected over time into large-scale changes that resulted in the emergence of wholly novel 
forms or "speciation". 
 
This was followed shortly after by the work of the American pragmatic philosophers (James, 
Peirce, Dewey) and the founding of two new disciplines, psychology and anthropology, both of 
which were oriented toward cataloging and developing explanatory frameworks for the variety 
of behavior patterns (both individual and collective) that were becoming increasingly obvious to 
all systematic observers. The state of the world converged with the state of the evidence to 
make almost inevitable the development of a more modern framework for the analysis of 
substantive economic issues. 
 
Thorstein Veblen began his career in the midst of this period of intellectual ferment, and as a 
young scholar came into direct contact with some of the leading figures of the various 
movements that were to shape the style and substance of the newly-minted social sciences into 
the next century and beyond. Veblen saw the need for taking account of cultural variation in his 
approach; no universal "human nature" could possibly be invoked to explain the variety of 
norms and behaviors that the new science of anthropology showed to be the rule, rather than 
the exception. His singular analytical contribution was what came to be known as the 
"ceremonial / instrumental dichotomy"; Veblen saw that every culture is materially-based and 
dependent on tools and skills to support the "life process", while at the same time, every culture 
appeared to have a stratified structure of status ("invidious distinctions") that ran entirely 
contrary to the imperatives of the "instrumental" (read: "technological") aspects of group life. 
The "ceremonial" was related to the past, and conformed to and supported the tribal legends; 
"instrumental" was oriented toward the technological imperative to judge value by the ability to 
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control future consequences. The "Veblenian dichotomy" was a specialized variant of the 
"instrumental theory of value" due to John Dewey, with whom Veblen was to make contact 
briefly at the University of Chicago. 
 
The most important works by Veblen include, but are not restricted to, his most famous works 
(Theory of the Leisure Class (TOLC); Theory of Business Enterprise (TOBE)), but his monograph 
Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution and the essay entitled Why is Economics not an 
Evolutionary Science have both been influential in shaping the research agenda for following 
generations of social scientists. TOLC and TOBE together constitute an alternative construction 
on the neoclassical marginalist theories of consumption and production, respectively. Both are 
clearly founded on the application of the "Veblenian dichotomy" to cultural patterns of 
behavior, and are therefore implicitly but unavoidably bound to a critical stance; Veblen's 
theories cannot be well understood unless one grasps that the dichotomy is at its core a 
valuational principle. The ceremonial patterns of activity are not bound to just any past, but 
rather to the one that generated a specific set of advantages and prejudices that underlie the 
current structure of rewards and power. Instrumental judgments create benefits according to an 
entirely separate criterion, and therefore are inherently subversive. This line of analysis was 
more fully and explicitly developed by Clarence E. Ayres of the University of Texas at Austin from 
the 1920s. 
 
Kenneth Boulding was one of the advocates of the evolutionary methods in social science, as is 
evident from Kenneth Boulding's Evolutionary Perspective. Kenneth Arrow, Ronald Coase and 
Douglass North are some of the ‘Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of 
Alfred Nobel’ winners who are known by their sympathy to the field. More narrowly the works 
Jack Downie and Edith Penrose are the sources of many insights for those thinking about 
evolution at the level of the firm in an industry. 
 
7.2. Schumpeter's "Entwicklung": The evolutionary economics cannot be understood without 
the contribution of Joseph Schumpeter, who lived in the first half of 20th century. He was the 
author of the book The Theory of Economic Development. It is important to note that for the 
word development he used in his native language, the German word "Entwicklung", which can 
be translated as development or evolution. The translators of the day used the word 
"development" from the French "développement", as opposed to "evolution" as this was used 
by Darwin. However it makes more sense to look at the economy as "evolution" (or 
Entwicklung) than "development", which refers more to bring something to a fixed state, 
instead of a process that can go anywhere. Schumpeter, in his later writings in English as a 
professor at Harvard, used the word "evolution", but the damage by the first translators was 
done. People kept referring to economic development. 
 
In Schumpeter's book he proposed an idea radical for its time: The evolutionary perspective. He 
based his theory on the assumption of usual macroeconomic equilibrium, which is something 
like "the normal mode of economic affairs". This equilibrium is being perpetually destroyed by 
entrepreneurs who try to introduce innovations. A successful introduction of an innovation 
disturbs the normal flow of economic life, because it forces some of the already existing 
technologies and means of production to lose their positions within the economy. 
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7.3. Present state of discussion: One of the major contributions to the emerging field of 
evolutionary economics has been the publication of 'An Evolutionary Theory of Economic 
Change' by Richard Nelson and Sidney Winter. These authors have focused mostly on the issue 
of changes in technology and routines, suggesting a framework for their analysis. If the change 
occurs constantly in the economy, then some kind of evolutionary process must be in act, and 
there has been a proposal that this process is Darwinian in nature. Then, mechanisms that 
provide selection, generate variation and establish self-replication, must be identified.  
 
It has been proposed that markets act as the major selection vehicles. As firms compete, 
unsuccessful rivals fail to capture an appropriate market share, go bankrupt and have to exit. 
The variety of competing firms is both in their products and practices, that are matched against 
markets. Both products and practices are determined by routines that firms use: standardized 
patterns of actions implemented constantly. By imitating these routines, firms propagate them 
and thus establish inheritance of successful practices. 
 
Ulrich Witt has proposed that an appropriate tool set for socio-economic evolution analysis is 
provided by the range of self-organization and complexity theories, that deal with phenomena 
of emergence and increasing complexity. 
 
As Philip Mirowski has demonstrated in his book 'More Heat than Light', the first 200 years of 
economic theory was modeled primarily on physics — economic terminology like "labour force", 
"equilibrium", "elasticity", and "velocity of money", are no accident. 
 
Howard Aldrich, Geoffrey Hodgson, David Hull, Thorbjoern Knudsen, Joel Mokyr, Viktor Vanberg 
and others have argued that the general Darwinian principles of variation, inheritance and 
selection apply to social as well as biological entities, despite important detailed differences in 
the mechanisms and processes involved. 
 
7.4. Axiomatization of evolutionary economics: A number of authors have aimed to outline 
common features of evolutionary schools in economics. In particular, such attempts were made 
by Kurt Dopfer, Carsten Herrmann-Pillath and Hardy Hanappi. According to their proposals, 
empirical axiomatics could be built on three propositions: (1) real phenomena are actualizations 
of ideas, (2) actualizations are matter-energy manifestations in space and time, (3) real 
phenomena evolve.  
 
Ideas are articulated in language and thus transported into the social domain. Generic ideas, in 
particular, can bring about cognitive and behavioral processes, and in this respect they are 
practical and associated with the notion of ‘productive knowledge’. It is generic ideas that 
evolve and form causal powers underlying the change. Evolutionary economics is essentially 
about changes in generic knowledge, and involves transition between actualized generic ideas. 
Actual phenomena, being manifestations of ideas, are seen as ‘carriers of knowledge’. 
 
Three analytical concepts corresponding to ontological axiomatics are thus: 
 
(1) carriers of knowledge,  
(2) generic ideas as components of a process, and  
(3) evolutionary-formative causality.  
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The latter implies that no law that could apply universally in space and time, could be 
formulated. Instead, a ‘variable law’ (in terms of Charles Peirce) could be speculated about, that 
is a generic idea that shapes the social dynamics but changes over time. 
 
The logic of the invariant of evolutionary process in social science is seen as the following 
sequence, described as an ‘evolutionary regime’: 
 
In the first phase, generic ideas originate.  
In the second phase, macroscopic (population-level) adoptions governed by various mechanisms 
(selection, path dependence, learning effects etc.) occur.  
In the third phase, stabilization based on high-frequency adoption, happens.  
 
Thus, evolutionary process is essentially irreversible, and it is seen as a transition from one state 
of generic idea dominance to another. Evolution represents a genealogy of regimes, that come 
into existence through adoption by populations of economic agents. This can be achieved either 
through Darwinian evolution (as considered by Nelson and Winter), or through emergence of 
‘critical masses’ as suggested by Witt. 
 
Thus, evolutionary economics is concerned with the transformation of generic ideas, or social 
and technical knowledge, that determine states of socio-economic system, and dominating 
economic phenomena (products, technologies, institutional arrangements) within these. Every 
possible state, form and determining idea is a passing one, but its emergence is no occasion, it is 
guided by the logic of evolutionary laws. 
 
Frank (1998), Foster  and Metcalfe (2001) and Dopfer and Potts (2008) aptly outline  the 
characteric features of evolutionary economics. A rich material on evolutionary economics can 
be obtained at  http://www.webng.com/economics. 
 
8.0. Agent-based computational economics: An agent-based model (ABM) is a computational 
model for simulating the actions and interactions of autonomous individuals in a network, with 
a view to assessing their effects on the system as a whole. It combines elements of game theory, 
complex systems, emergence, computational sociology, multi agent systems, and evolutionary 
programming. Monte Carlo Methods are used to introduce randomness. 
 
The models simulate the simultaneous operations of multiple agents, in an attempt to re-create 
and predict the actions of complex phenomena. The process is one of emergence from the 
lower (micro) level of systems to a higher (macro) level. The individual agents are presumed to 
be acting in what they perceive as their own interests, such as reproduction, economic benefit, 
or social status, and their knowledge is limited. ABM agents may experience "learning", 
adaptation, and reproduction. 
 
8.1. History of agent-based computational economics: The idea of agent-based modeling was 
developed as a relatively simple concept in the late 1940s. Since it requires computation-
intensive procedures, it did not become widespread until the 1990s. 
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The history of the agent-based model can be traced back to the Von Neumann machine, a 
theoretical machine capable of reproduction. The device von Neumann proposed would follow 
precisely detailed instructions to fashion a copy of itself. The concept was then improved by von 
Neumann's friend Stanisław Ulam, also a mathematician; Ulam suggested that the machine be 
built on paper, as a collection of cells on a grid. The idea intrigued von Neumann, who drew it 
up—creating the first of the devices later termed cellular automata. 
 
Another improvement was introduced by the mathematician John Conway. He constructed the 
well-known Game of Life. Unlike von Neumann's machine, Conway's Game of Life operated by 
tremendously simple rules in a virtual world in the form of a 2-dimensional checkerboard. 
 
The creation of agent-based models of social systems is often credited to the computer scientist 
Craig Reynolds. He tried to model the reality of lively biological agents, known as artificial life, a 
term coined by Christopher Langton. 
 
At the same time, during the 1980s, social scientists, mathematicians, operations researchers, 
and a scattering of people from other disciplines developed Computational and Mathematical 
Organization Theory (CMOT). This field grew as a special interest group of The Institute of 
Management Sciences (TIMS) and its sister society, the Operations Research Society of America 
(ORSA). Through the mid-1990s, the field focused on such issues as designing effective teams, 
understanding the communication required for organizational effectiveness, and the behavior of 
social networks. With the appearance of SWARM in the mid-1990s and RePast in 2000, as well 
as some custom-designed code, CMOT -- later renamed Computational Analysis of Social and 
Organizational Systems (CASOS) -- incorporated more and more agent-based modeling.  
 
8.2. Theory of agent-based modeling: Most computational modeling research describes 
systems in equilibrium or as moving between equilibria. Agent-based modeling, however, using 
simple rules, can result in far more complex and interesting behavior. The three ideas central to 
agent-based models are social agents as objects, emergence, and complexity. Agent-based 
models consist of dynamically interacting rule based agents. The systems within which they 
interact can create real world-like complexity. These agents are: (i) Intelligent and purposeful, 
but not so intelligent as to reach the cognitive closure implied by game theory, (ii) Situated in 
space and time - they reside in networks and in lattice-like neighborhoods. The location of the 
agents and their responsive and purposeful behavior are encoded in algorithmic form in 
computer programs. The modeling process is best described as inductive. The modeler makes 
those assumptions thought most relevant to the situation at hand and then watches 
phenomena emerge from the agents' interactions. Sometimes that result is an equilibrium. 
Sometimes it is an emergent pattern. Sometimes, however, it is an unintelligible mangle.  
 
In some ways, agent-based models complement traditional analytic methods. Where analytic 
methods enable humans to characterize the equilibria of a system, agent-based models allow 
the possibility of generating those equilibria. This generative contribution may be the most 
mainstream of the potential benefits of agent-based modeling. Agent-based models can explain 
the emergence of higher order patterns -- network structures of terrorist organizations and the 
Internet, power law distributions in the sizes of traffic jams, wars, and stock market crashes, and 
social segregation that persists despite populations of tolerant people. Agent-based models also 
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can be used to identify lever points, defined as moments in time in which interventions have 
extreme consequences, and to distinguish among types of path dependency. 
 
Rather than focusing on stable states, the models consider a system's robustness -- the ways 
that complex systems adapt to internal and external pressures so as to maintain their 
functionalities. The task of harnessing that complexity requires consideration of the agents 
themselves -- their diversity, connectedness, and level of interactions. 
 
8.3. Applications of agent-based models: Agent-based models have been used since the mid-
1990s to solve a variety of business and technology problems. Examples of applications include 
supply chain optimization and logistics, modeling of consumer behavior, including word of 
mouth, social network effects, distributed computing, workforce management, and portfolio 
management. They have also been used to analyze traffic congestion In these and other 
applications, the system of interest is simulated by capturing the behavior of individual agents 
and their interconnections. Agent-based modeling tools can be used to test how changes in 
individual behaviors will affect the system's emerging overall behavior. 
 
Other models have analyzed the spread of epidemics, the threat of biowarfare, the growth and 
decline of ancient civilizations, and the human immune system. 
 
 
9.0. New institutional economics:  New institutional economics (NIE) is an economic 
perspective that attempts to extend economics by focusing on the social and legal norms and 
rules that underlie economic activity. 
 
9.1. Overview of new institutional economics: Although NIE has its roots in Ronald Coase's 
fundamental insights about the critical role of institutional frameworks and transaction costs for 
economic performance, at present NIE analyses are built on a more complex set of 
methodological principles and criteria. They now depart from both mainstream Neoclassical 
economics and "old" institutional economics, though authors often care about both efficiency 
and distribution issues. The term 'New Institutional Economics' was coined by Oliver Williamson 
in 1975. 
 
Among the many concepts/aspects that are often taken into account in current NIE analyses 
these can be mentioned: organizational arrangements, transaction costs, credible 
commitments, modes of governance, persuasive abilities, social norms, ideological values, 
decisive perceptions, gained control, enforcement mechanism, asset specificity, human assets, 
social capital, asymmetric information, strategic behavior, bounded rationality, opportunism, 
adverse selection, moral hazard, contractual safeguards, surrounding uncertainty, monitoring 
costs, incentives to collude, hierarchical structures, bargaining strength, etc. 
 
9.2. Institutional levels: Although no single, universally accepted set of definitions has been 
developed, most scholars doing research under the NIE methodological principles and criteria 
follow Douglass North's demarcation between institutions and organizations. Institutions are 
the "rules of the game", consisting of both the formal legal rules and the informal social norms 
that govern individual behavior and structure social interactions (institutional frameworks). 
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Organizations, by contrast, are those groups of people and the governance arrangements they 
create to coordinate their team action against other teams performing also as organizations. 
Firms, Universities, clubs, medical associations, unions etc are some examples. 
 
Because some institutional frameworks are realities always "nested" inside other broader 
institutional frameworks, this clear demarcation is always blurred in actual situations. A case in 
point is a University. When the average quality of its teaching services must be evaluated, for 
example, a University may be approached as an organization with its people, physical capital, 
the general governing rules common to all that were passed by the University governing bodies 
etc. However, if the task consists of evaluating people's performance in a specific teaching 
department, for example, along with their own internal formal and informal rules, then the 
University as a whole enters the picture as an institution. General University rules, then, form 
part of the broader institutional framework influencing people's performance at the said 
teaching department. 
 
10.0. Post-autistic economics: The movement for Post-Autistic Economics (PAE) was born 
through the work of Sorbonne economist Bernard Guerrien. Started in Spring 2000 by group of 
disaffected French economics students, Post-Autistic Economics first reached a wider audience 
in June 2000 after an interview in Le Monde. 
 
It was supported by the Cambridge Ph.D. students in 2001 with the publication of "Opening Up 
Economics: A Proposal By Cambridge Students", later signed by 797 economists. 
 
The term autistic is used in an informal way, synonymous to "closed-minded" or "self-
absorbed". It has been criticized for using the medical diagnosis, autism, as a derogatory 
expression. The movement is best seen as a forum of different groups critical of the current 
mainstream: from behavioral and heterodox to feminist, green economics and econo-physics. 
 
10.1. Concept underlying the PAE: PAE has challenged standard neoclassical assumptions and 
incorporated ideas from sociology and psychology into economic analysis. Specifically, the 
notions of utility theory, rational choice, production and efficiency theory (Pareto optimality), 
and game theory have been criticised: one much-discussed article is Is There Anything Worth 
Keeping in Standard Microeconomics?.  Other topics include "Gross National Happiness", realism 
vs. mathematical consistency, "Thermodynamics and Economics", or "Irrelevance and Ideology". 
Contributors include Bruce Caldwell, James K. Galbraith, Robert L. Heilbroner, Bernard Guerrien, 
Emmanuelle Benicourt, Ha-Joon Chang, Herman Daly and Richard Wolff. 
 
11.0. Ecological economics: Ecological economics is a transdisciplinary field of academic 
research within economics that aims to address the interdependence between human 
economies and natural ecosystems. It is distinguished from environmental economics by its 
connection to outside disciplines within the natural sciences, social sciences, and humanities 
and its focus on the "scale" conundrum, or how to operate an economy within the ecological 
constraints of earth's natural resources. According to ecological economist Malte Faber, 
ecological economics is defined by its focus on nature, justice, and time. Issues of 
intergenerational equity, irreversibility of environmental change, uncertainty of long-term 
outcomes, and sustainable development guide ecological economic analysis and valuation. 
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The identity of ecological economics as a field has been described as fragile, with no generally 
accepted theoretical framework and a knowledge structure which is not clearly defined. 
Ecological economists have questioned fundamental mainstream economic approaches such as 
cost-benefit analysis, and the separability of economic values from scientific research, 
contending that economics is unavoidably normative rather than positive (empirical). Positional 
analysis, which attempts to incorporate time and justice issues, is proposed as an alternative. 
 
The related field of biophysical economics, sometimes referred to also as bio-economics, is 
based on a conceptual model of the economy connected to, and sustained by, a flow of energy, 
materials, and ecosystem services. Analysts from a variety of disciplines have conducted 
research on the economy-environment relationship, with concern for energy and material flows 
and sustainability, environmental quality, and economic development. 
 
In ecological economics, a complex circular flow diagram reflects the input of solar energy, 
which sustains natural inputs and environmental services, which are then used as factors of 
production. After these natural inputs are consumed, they are outputted as pollution and waste. 
The potential of an environment to make services and materials is called an environment's 
source function, and this function is depleted as resources are consumed or pollution 
contaminates the resources. The sink function describes an environment's ability to absorb and 
render harmless waste and pollution; when waste output exceeds the limit of the sink function, 
long-term damage occurs. 
 
The economic value of natural capital is accepted by mainstream environmental economics, but 
is emphasized as especially important in ecological economics. Ecological economists may begin 
by estimating how to maintain a stable environment before assessing the cost in monetary 
terms.  Ecological economist Robert Costanza led an attempted valuation of the global 
ecosystem in 1997. Initially published in Nature, the article concluded on $33 trillion with a 
range from $16 trillion to $54 trillion (in 1997, total global GDP was $27 trillion. Half of the value 
went to nutrient cycling. The open oceans, continental shelves, and estuaries had the highest 
total value, and the highest per-hectare values went to estuaries, swamps/floodplains, and 
seagrass/algae beds. The work was criticized by articles in Ecological Economics Volume 25, 
Issue 1, but the critics acknowledged the positive potential for economic valuation of the global 
ecosystem. 
 
An important motivation for the emergence of ecological economics has been criticism of the 
assumptions and approaches of traditional environmental and resource economics, and further 
a need to distinguish from the social goals of green politics. 
 
By contrast, ecological economics presents a scientific but still more pluralistic approach to 
study of environmental problems and policy solutions, characterized by systems perspectives 
and a focus on physical and biological contexts and long-term environmental sustainability. 
Ecological economics might be regarded as a version of environmental science or human 
geography with much emphasis on social, political, economic, behavioral and ethical issues. 
However, it seeks to state its assumptions in a framework similar to that of classical economics 
with expanded definitions of infrastructure, defense, currency and justice that match the 
constraints of a society in which carrying capacity is now scarcer. 
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Various competing schools of thought exist in the field. Some are close to resource and 
environmental economics while others are far more heterodox in outlook. An example of the 
latter is the European Society for Ecological Economics. An example of the former is the Swedish 
Beijer International Institute of Ecological Economics. 
 
11.1. Distinctive features: What differentiates ecological economics schools from classical 
thought is that capital asset analysis (land, labour, financial capital) has been expanded to make 
land more active and include the operations of other ecosystems such as rivers, oceans and the 
atmosphere. In other words, land has been broadened into the concept of natural capital. 
Furthermore, the analysis of labour is often much more fine-grained and includes examination 
of the unique ways in which labour adapts to its surroundings. Indigenous languages, for 
instance, tend to acquire distinctions that match the ecosystems and lifeways in which they 
operate to enable awareness that colonialism and globalization generally override and ignore. 
The social capital and possibly unique talents or instructions of a culture will be more closely 
identified with the location and surrounding ecosystems than in the classical. 
 
Ecological economics inherits some mathematical assumptions from neoclassical economics in 
that it will employ aggregate measures for genuinely aggregated resources such as the CO2 
absorption capacity of the atmosphere (the amount it can absorb before global warming begins 
to occur). It however generally rejects the neoclassical assumption that local differences in the 
means of production or extraction method are just another externality, since living ecosystems 
are impossible to repay or reproduce and often extraordinarily expensive to replace or augment. 
Unlike the neoclassical assumption of a high-liquidity world in which there are a near infinite 
number of technology and supply substitutes, ecological economics tends instead to assume 
that only a narrow range of such substitutes, similar to those used in nature, will prove feasible 
as a long-term economic proposition for those living within the biosphere. The major and most 
obvious difference is that neoclassical economics is wholly unconcerned with the proportion of 
the supply chain absorbed by transport costs and also unconcerned with the issues in alienation 
of property rights when consuming goods from far away. 
 
The most cogent example of how the different theories treat similar assets is tropical rainforest 
ecosystems, most obviously the Yasuni region of Ecuador. While this area has substantial 
deposits of bitumen it is also one of the most diverse ecosystems on Earth and some estimates 
establish it has over 200 undiscovered medical substances in its genomes - most of which would 
be destroyed by logging the forest or mining the bitumen. Effectively, the instructional capital of 
the genomes is undervalued by both classical and neoclassical means which would view the 
rainforest primarily as a source of wood, oil/tar and perhaps food. Increasingly the carbon credit 
for leaving the extremely carbon-intensive ("dirty") bitumen in the ground is also valued - the 
government of Ecuador set a price of US$350M for an oil lease with the intent of selling it to 
someone committed to never exercising it at all and instead preserving the rainforest. Bill 
Clinton, Paul Martin and other former world leaders have become closely involved in this 
project which includes lobbying for the issue of International Monetary Fund Special Drawing 
Rights to recognize the rainforest's value directly within the framework of the Bretton Woods 
institutions. If successful this would be a major victory for advocates of ecological economics as 
the new mainstream form of economics. 
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11.2. History and development of ecological economics: The first book with the title Ecological 
Economics was published in Europe by Juan Martinez-Alier   tracing the history of ecological 
critiques of economics since the 1880s to the 1950s. European conceptual founders include 
Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen, William Kapp   and Karl Polanyi. Furthermore, some key concepts 
of what is now ecological economics are evident in the writings of E.F. Schumacher, whose book 
Small Is Beautiful – A Study of Economics as if People Mattered   was published just a few years 
before the first edition of Herman Daly's comprehensive and persuasive Steady-State 
Economics.   
 
The antecedents can be traced back to the Romantics of the 1800s as well as some 
Enlightenment political economists of that era. Concerns over population were expressed by 
Thomas Malthus, while John Stuart Mill hypothesized that the "stationary state" of an economy 
might be something that could be considered desirable, anticipating later insights of modern 
ecological economists, without having had their experience of the social and ecological costs of 
the dramatic post-World War II industrial expansion. As Martinez-Alier explores in his book the 
debate on energy in economic systems can also be traced into the 1800s e.g. Nobel prize-
winning chemist, Frederick Soddy. 
 
In North America, conceptual founders include economists Kenneth Boulding and Herman Daly, 
ecologists C.S. Holling, H.T. Odum and Robert Costanza, biologist Gretchen Daily and physicist 
Robert Ayres. Daly and Costanza were part of the institutional founding of the field - resulting in 
the establishment of the academic journal Ecological Economics and the International Society 
for Ecological Economics (ISEE). Some attribute origination of ecological economics as a specific 
field per se to professor Herman Daly, University of Maryland, a former economist at the World 
Bank. Ecological economics has been popularized by ecologist and University of Vermont 
Professor Robert Costanza. CUNY geography professor David Harvey explicitly added ecological 
concerns to political economic literature. This parallel development in political economy has 
been continued by analysts such as sociologist John Bellamy Foster. 
 
The Romanian economist Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen, who was among Daly's teachers at 
Vanderbilt University, provided ecological economics with a modern conceptual framework 
based on the material and energy flows of economic production and consumption. His magnum 
opus, The Entropy Law and the Economic Process, has been highly influential. 
 
11.3. Green economics: Green Economics is a more recent development that goes beyond the 
traditional scope of Ecological Economics but shares some of its basic principles. Green 
Economics comprises all aspects and sub-disciplines of economics, not only ecology related, and 
analyses economic issues with a pluralistic, holistic and long term view. The aim of this emerging 
discipline is the reform of mainstream economics towards an unbiased understanding of 
economic facts and the political choices available to enhance the economic freedom available to 
all stakeholders. Comprehensive academic work in this field is organised and co-ordinated by 
the Green Economics Institute, an academic think tank founded in 2004 in the UK, which edits 
the International Journal of Green Economics. (The term Green Economics is in addition 
employed by UK based individuals acting as a political lobby and activist forum rather than 
taking the purely academic approach dominant amongst other ecological economists). 
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Articles by Inge Ropke and Clive Spash cover the development and modern history of ecological 
economics and explain its differentiation from resource and environmental economics, as well 
as some of the controversy between American and European schools of thought. 
 
11.4. Objectives of ecological economics: The primary objective of ecological economics is to 
ground economic thinking and practice in physical reality, especially in the laws of physics 
(particularly the laws of thermodynamics) and in knowledge of biological systems. It accepts as a 
goal the improvement of human well-being through development, and seeks to ensure 
achievement of this through planning for the sustainable development of ecosystems and 
societies. Of course the terms development and sustainable development are far from lacking 
controversy. Richard Norgaard argues traditional economics has hi-jacked the development 
terminology in his book Development Betrayed. Well-being in ecological economics is also 
differentiated from welfare as found in mainstream economics and the 'new welfare economics' 
from the 1930s which informs resource and environmental economics, both of which are 
anthropocentric. This entails a limited preference utilitarian conception of value i.e., Nature is 
valuable to our economies, that is because people will pay for its services such as clean air, clean 
water, encounters with wilderness, etc. 
 
Ecological economics distinguishes itself from neoclassical economics primarily by its assertion 
that the economy is an embedded within an environmental system. Ecology deals with the 
energy and matter transactions of life and the Earth, and the human economy is by definition 
contained within this system. Ecological economists feel neoclassical economics has ignored the 
environment, at best relegating it to be a subset of the human economy. Economic theory, as 
encapsulated in general equilibrium models, then assume both an infinite resource base and 
also infinite waste sinks with no feedbacks; in simpler terms, resources never run out and 
pollution never occurs. This allows neoclassical economics to claim theoretically that infinite 
economic growth is both possible and desirable. 
 
However, this belief disagrees with much of what the natural sciences have learned about the 
world, and, according to Ecological Economics, completely ignores the contributions of Nature 
to the creation of wealth e.g., the planetary endowment of scarce matter and energy, along 
with the complex and biologically diverse ecosystems that provide goods and ecosystem 
services directly to human communities: micro- and macro-climate regulation, water recycling, 
water purification, storm water regulation, waste absorption, food and medicine production, 
pollination, protection from solar and cosmic radiation, the view of a starry night sky, etc. 
 
There has then been a move to regard such things as natural capital and ecosystems functions 
as goods and services. However, this is far from uncontroversial within ecology or ecological 
economics due to the potential for narrowing down values to those found in mainstream 
economics and the danger of merely regarding Nature as a commodity. This has been referred 
to as ecologists 'selling out on Nature'. There is then a concern that ecological economics has 
failed to learn from the extensive literature in environmental ethics about how to structure a 
plural value system. 
 
11.5. Ecological economics and  allocation of resources: Resource and neoclassical economics 
focus primarily on the efficient allocation of resources, and less on two other fundamental 
economic problems which are central to ecological economics: distribution (equity) and the 
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scale of the economy relative to the ecosystems upon which it is reliant. Ecological Economics 
also makes a clear distinction between growth (quantitative) and development (qualitative 
improvement of the quality of life) while arguing that neoclassical economics confuses the two. 
Ecological economics challenges the common normative approach taken towards natural 
resources, claiming that it misvalues nature by displaying it as interchangeable with human 
capital-labor and technology. Ecological Economics counters this convention by asserting that 
human capital is instead complementary to and dependent upon natural systems, as human 
capital inevitably derives from natural systems. From these premises, it follows that economic 
policy has a fiduciary responsibility to the greater ecological world, and that, by misvaluing the 
importance of nature, sustainable progress (as opposed to economic growth) - which is the only 
solution to elevating the standard of living for citizens worldwide - will not result. Furthermore, 
ecological economists point out that, beyond modest levels, increased per-capita consumption 
(the typical economic measure of "standard of living") does not necessarily lead to 
improvements in human well-being, while this same consumption can have harmful effects on 
the environment and broader societal well-being. 
 
11.6. Energy considerations in ecological economics: Ecological Economics rejects the view of 
energy economics that growth in the energy supply is related directly to well being, focusing 
instead on biodiversity and creativity - or natural capital and individual capital, in the 
terminology sometimes adopted to describe these economically. In practice, ecological 
economics focuses primarily on the key issues of uneconomic growth and quality of life. 
Ecological economists are inclined to acknowledge that much of what is important in human 
well-being is not analyzable from a strictly economic standpoint and suggests an 
interdisciplinary approach combining social and natural sciences as a means to address this. 
 
Thermo-economics (the main basis of energy economics) is based on the proposition that the 
role of energy in biological evolution should be defined and understood through the second law 
of thermodynamics but in terms of such economic criteria as productivity, efficiency, and 
especially the costs and benefits (or profitability) of the various mechanisms for capturing and 
utilizing available energy to build biomass and do work. As a result, thermo-economics are often 
discussed in the field of ecological economics, which itself is related to the fields of sustainability 
and sustainable development. 
 
An energy balance can be used to track energy through a system, and is a very useful tool for 
determining resource use and environmental impacts, using the First and the Second laws of 
thermodynamics, to determine how much energy is needed at each point in a system, and in 
what form that energy is a cost in various environmental issues.  The energy accounting system 
keeps track of energy in, energy out, and non-useful energy versus work done, and 
transformations within the system.   
 
Energy Accounting is the hypothetical system of distribution, proposed by Technocracy 
Incorporated in the Technocracy Study Course, which would record the energy used to produce 
and distribute goods and services consumed by citizens in a Technate. 
 
Scientists have written and speculated on different aspects of energy accounting.] Many 
variations of energy accounting are in use now, as this issue relates to current (price system) 
economics directly, as well as projected models in possible Non-market economics systems. 
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In Wealth, Virtual Wealth and Debt, Frederick Soddy turned his attention to the role of energy in 
economic systems. He criticized the focus on monetary flows in economics, arguing that “real” 
wealth was derived from the use of energy to transform materials into physical goods and 
services. Soddy’s economic writings were largely ignored in his time, but would later be applied 
to the development of bio-economics and ecological economics in the late 20th century. 
 
11.7.  Environmental services: A study was carried out by Costanza and colleagues to determine 
the 'price' of the services provided by the environment. This was determined by averaging 
values obtained from a range of studies conducted in very specific context and then transferring 
these without regard to that context. Dollar figures were averaged to a per hectare number for 
different types of ecosystem e.g. wetlands, oceans. A total was then produced which came out 
at 33 trillion US dollars (1997 values), more than twice the total GDP of the world at the time of 
the study. This study was criticized by pre-ecological and even some environmental economists - 
for being inconsistent with assumptions of financial capital valuation - and ecological economists 
- for being inconsistent with an ecological economics focus on biological and physical indicators. 
 
The whole idea of treating ecosystems as goods and services to be valued in monetary terms 
remains controversial to some. A common objection is that life is precious or priceless, but this 
demonstrably degrades to it being worthless under the assumptions of any branch of 
economics. Reducing human bodies to financial values is a necessary part of every branch of 
economics and not always in the direct terms of insurance or wages. Economics, in principle, 
assumes that conflict is reduced by agreeing on voluntary contractual relations and prices 
instead of simply fighting or coercing or tricking others into providing goods or services. In doing 
so, a provider agrees to surrender time and take bodily risks and other (reputation, financial) 
risks. Ecosystems are no different than other bodies economically except insofar as they are far 
less replaceable than typical labour or commodities. 
 
Despite these issues, many ecologists and conservation biologists are pursuing ecosystem 
valuation. Biodiversity measures in particular appear to be the most promising way to reconcile 
financial and ecological values, and there are many active efforts in this regard. The growing 
field of biodiversity finance began to emerge in 2008 in response to many specific proposals 
such as the Ecuadoran Yasuni proposal  or similar ones in the Congo. US news outlets treated 
the stories as a "threat"  to "drill a park"  reflecting a previously dominant view that NGOs and 
governments had the primary responsibility to protect ecosystems. However Peter Barnes and 
other commentators have recently argued that a guardianship/trustee/commons model is far 
more effective and takes the decisions out of the political realm. 
 
Commodification of other ecological relations as in carbon credit and direct payments to 
farmers to preserve ecosystem services are likewise examples that permit private parties to play 
more direct roles protecting biodiversity. The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization 
achieved near-universal agreement in 2008 that such payments directly valuing ecosystem 
preservation and encouraging permaculture were the only practical way out of a food crisis.  
 
11.8. Reconsideration of externalities: Ecological economics is founded upon the view that the 
assumption that environmental and community costs and benefits are mutually canceling 
"externalities" is not warranted. Juan Martinez Alier, for instance, shows that the bulk of 
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consumers are automatically excluded from having an impact upon the prices of commodities, 
as these consumers are future generations who have not been born yet. The assumptions 
behind future discounting, which assume that future goods will be cheaper than present goods, 
has been criticised by Fred Pearce and by the recent Stern Report. Although the Stern report 
itself does employ discounting and has been criticised by ecological economists. Concerning 
these externalities, Paul Hawken argues that the only reason why goods produced unsustainably 
are usually cheaper than goods produced sustainably is due to a hidden subsidy, paid by the non 
monetarised human environment, community or future generations. These arguments are 
developed further by Hawken, Amory and Hunter Lovins in "Natural Capitalism: Creating the 
Next Industrial Revolution". 
 
12.0. Concluding remarks: As it may be observed from the description given above, the different 
currents in modern economics are not yet synthesized, although each one revolts against the 
neoclassical orthodoxy. We may expect a synthesis in the near future that will replace 
neoclassical economics from the citadel of mainstream. Teaching of these strands of new 
economics has already begun in many universities, although in an un-integrated manner.  
However, until the neoclassical microeconomics and macroeconomics are replaced by their 
alternatives and necessary tools of economic analysis are developed, neoclassicism would not 
give a way to modern economics.  
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